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INTRODUCTION
Google stands alone as the monopoly gatekeeper for the Internet. Its search
engine monopoly controls traffic to all websites. Its online search advertising
monopoly – which monetizes its gateway function – controls the other way
consumers reach websites through Google (search-based advertising). The
combination of Google’s gatekeeping and advertising monopolies enables Google
to entrench its dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation in its search
monopoly. For more than a decade, Google has accelerated its creation of its own
products and has embedded them seamlessly in its search results in anticompetitive
ways. As one U.S. Senator told Google: “You run the race track. You own the
race track. For a long time you had no horses. Now you have horses and have
control over where those horses are placed and your horses seem to be winning.” 1
Google alone regulates a ubiquitous platform where enormous web traffic
originates and, more frequently, ends. Numerous specialized or “vertical” search
sites that might rival Google in specialized searches involving local services (e.g.,
Yelp), travel (e.g., Expedia) or, as here, online images, depend upon traffic
originating on Google’s platform for their survival. Now, these sites compete with
Google’s products on Google’s platform. Dreamstime, which offers a service like
1

https://ctnewsjunkie.com/2011/09/22/blumenthal compares google to a race tra
ck owner/.
1
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Google Images (albeit more specialized), found itself in Google’s way and got
trampled: its Google search ranking tanked; Google Images pilfered its content and
traffic; its cost of Google advertising skyrocketed; and all the while Google failed
to deliver on its advertising promises.
Within this backdrop, Dreamstime appeals from the dismissal of its antitrust
monopolization claim and grant of summary judgment against its claims for breach
of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and breach of the contractual
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court wrongly
dismissed the antitrust claim without leave to amend at the pleading stage. Then, it
summarily adjudicated the remaining state law claims by incorrectly applying the
law and impermissibly making factual determinations in Google’s favor.
More specifically, this appeal from the motion to dismiss addresses Google’s
unlawful abuse of its search and search advertising monopoly through the
elimination of specialized search providers who are also Google’s ads consumers.
Dreamstime alleged, among other things: (a) within its search results, Google selfpreferenced Google Images and simultaneously demoted Dreamstime from
prominence to near-invisibility for key search terms; (b) Google misappropriated
the content of Dreamstime and others and presented it without compensation in
Google Images, causing confusion and encouraging theft; (c) as Dreamstime’s
reliance on Google’s advertising increased, Google manipulated its ad programs to

2
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hinder Dreamstime’s ability to reach potential customers; and (d) through these
practices, Google captured traffic from Dreamstime and others and abused the vast
data it obtained from this traffic to erect further entry barriers to its search
monopoly.
Recently, the House of Representatives subcommittee tasked with
investigating Google, 2 the Department of Justice3 and most of the States 4
recognized that the type of conduct alleged here is anticompetitive and harms
competition in Google’s relevant market. They confirm what Dreamstime alleged:
Google built Google Images by misappropriating the content of specialized search
rivals like Dreamstime, then demoted those rivals in Google’s search results to
eliminate a potential source of innovation and competition. Now, Google Images
is the largest and most dominant image search repository in the world, allowing
Google to maintain its dominance over its general search engine rivals and quash
innovation from specialized image search providers.

“Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets,” Majority Staff Report and
Recommendations, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative
Law of the Committee of the Judiciary (hereinafter “House Report”). Motion for
Judicial Notice, Exhibit 1.
3
U.S. v. Google, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. October 10, 2020),
Dkt 1 (hereinafter “DOJ Suit”). Rather than move to dismiss, Google answered.
Dkt 87.
4
Colorado, et al. v. Google, No. 1:20-cv-03715 (D.D.C. December 27, 2020),
Dkt 3 (hereinafter “States’ Suit”).
2

3
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Just as Microsoft was found to have improperly maintained its operating
system monopoly through conduct directed at the makers of Netscape and Java,
Google has unlawfully maintained and extended its search-related monopolies
through exclusionary conduct directed at Dreamstime and other specialized image
search providers. As a result, potential alternate online search or search
advertising channels can no longer emerge and access to Dreamstime’s higher
quality services is artificially reduced. The district court dismissed Dreamstime’s
antitrust claim because Dreamstime does not offer search advertising, which to the
court meant it could not plausibly allege “harm to competition.” 1-ER-32-34. This
rigid analysis is at odds with antitrust precedent, which is inherently more flexible
and intended to prohibit Google’s conduct.
The district court also erred in summarily adjudicating Dreamstime’s UCL
and breach of the implied covenant claims. Most egregiously, it disposed of
Dreamstime’s ad-related fraud claims based on an erroneous legal conclusion that
Google’s contractual disclaimers ended the claims, ignoring well-settled California
law.
Dreamstime also claimed that Google actively defrauded it with respect to
the causes of its demotion in organic search to induce Dreamstime to keep
spending on Google’s ads as its search traffic dwindled. The court improperly
dismissed these claims by accepting Google’s extensively disputed, self-serving

4
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testimony about what it “believed” to be the cause of Dreamstime’s demotion. The
record clearly showed Dreamstime repeatedly asked Google if an algorithmic
change was the cause of its demotion and Google voluntarily answered with halftruths, assuring Dreamstime its own website content was the problem and omitting
material facts indicating that an algorithmic change was the cause. This was fraud.
Finally, the district court erroneously disposed of Dreamstime’s breach of
implied covenant claims by finding that the parties’ contract did not confer upon
Google the discretion to provide a dedicated ad-support team to Dreamstime. But
the contract did expressly give Google discretion to provide these services (which
it did in bad faith). Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the implied covenant
also renders it meaningless. It should not matter whether the services which
Google provided in bad faith were expressly foreseen by the contract or whether
Google undertook them on its own initiative. When Google performed these
services in bad faith and frustrated the contract’s purposes, it violated the implied
covenant.
Reversal is warranted.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had original and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claim for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) and

5
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supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1331 and
1367. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On January 28, 2019, the district court granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s antitrust claim with prejudice. 1-ER-22-40. On July 3, 2020,
the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the
remaining state law claims; judgment was thereon entered. 1-ER-2-21. On July
30, 2020, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal of both orders pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a). 6-ER-1318-1327.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues:
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing plaintiff’s monopolization

claim by finding plaintiff had not plausibly alleged any anticompetitive acts?
2.

Did the district court err in dismissing plaintiff’s monopolization

claim by finding plaintiff had not plausibly alleged antitrust injury?
3.

Did the district court err in refusing to allow further amendment of

plaintiff’s complaint before providing notice as to the pleading’s deficiencies?
4.

Did the district court err by impermissibly resolving material factual

disputes in defendant’s favor and granting summary judgment against plaintiff on
its UCL claims?

6
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5.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment against

plaintiff on its breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Statement of the Case begins with the allegations pertinent to the
dismissal of Dreamstime’s antitrust claim (which must be taken as true), followed
by the evidence presented at summary judgment on the remaining claims and the
procedural history of the rulings under review.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RELEVANT TO DREAMSTIME’S
MONOPOLIZATION CLAIM
Dreamstime plausibly alleged that Google exploited its uncontested

monopoly over the online search and search advertising markets, “by crippling or
eliminating sites such as Dreamstime that compete for the same web traffic [and]
offer similar services related to images.” 5-ER-1019(¶1). In doing so, it
forecloses competition, reduces innovation and restricts consumer choice in
Google’s search markets. 5-ER-1023-25(¶¶6-8); 5-ER-1037-62(¶¶37-97); 5-ER1067-69(¶¶111-22); 5-ER-1072-78(¶¶131-47).
A.

Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Injured Dreamstime in the
Relevant Market

Google operates the world’s largest online search engine, the gateway to the
Internet for the vast majority of people and businesses. 5-ER-1019-20(¶2.a). It
monetizes its general online search business by displaying search-based ads within
7
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its organic (non-paid) search results or by displaying ads on other websites. 5-ER1028(¶18); 5-ER-1030-31(¶24). Google has a monopoly in both online search and
online search advertising. 5 5-ER-1029-30(¶¶21-23). Dreamstime alleged the two
markets – search and search advertising – separately for precision, but they are
effectively one and the same, because Google sells ads that appear within its search
results. 5-ER-1030-31(¶24). Google monopolizes search advertising because it
has a monopoly in search. Id. To maximize its advertising potential, Google
tracks human behavior on its and its partners’ sites. Through this vast network,
mostly invisible, Google collects data from billions of people worldwide.
On one hand, Dreamstime’s antitrust injuries, such as its loss in visibility to
consumers via organic search, stem from Google’s search monopoly: its ability to
control the flow of traffic to downstream rivals through its search engine or its
Google Images feature, both of which overlap. 5-ER-1026-27(¶¶10-11).
Relatedly, Dreamstime’s antitrust injury stems from Google’s vast web crawling
abilities, from which it scraped and misappropriated content from Dreamstime and
others to display within Google Images without compensation, confusing users as
to the source of the images and encouraging theft of images. 5-ER-1025(¶9); 5ER-1061-62(¶¶96-97); 5-ER-1077(¶146).
Google has monopoly power in the relevant market by its dominant share (at least
70%), ability to exclude competition and/or its ability to control output and pricing.
5-ER-1029-31(¶¶21-25); 5-ER-1069-70(¶¶120-22).
5
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On the other hand, Dreamstime’s antitrust injuries flow directly from
Google’s monopoly in search advertising, as it was able to charge Dreamstime
supracompetitive prices to further reduce its ability to compete with Google
Images for traffic. 5-ER-1065-66(¶105). Just as search and search advertising are
intertwined, so are the facets of Dreamstime’s antitrust injury: a decrease in the
Dreamstime’s organic visibility (the first injury) necessitates increased spending on
paid search advertising (the second injury) to offset the loss in traffic from the first
injury. In both cases, Google benefits – it further entrenches its monopoly, its
economic power over its rivals grows, and it continues to collect data from its
consumers that creates insurmountable entry barriers.
B.

Dreamstime’s Antitrust Standing
1. Dreamstime Is a Vertical Image Search Threat to Google Images

Dreamstime alleged antitrust standing as a vertical search rival to Google.
“Dreamstime has a searchable repository of tens of millions of images for purchase
(and millions of free images) that allows one to search for and browse images by
keyword like Google Images, with the added benefit of allowing users to
immediately purchase the image.” 5-ER-1021(¶2.c); 5-ER-1044-58(¶¶55-58); 5ER-1071-72(¶¶127-128); 5-ER-1120-23.

9
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A recent Report of a Congressional subcommittee tasked with investigating
Google described the relationship between horizonal and vertical search engines,
specifically mentioning Dreamstime:
There are two types of search engines: horizontal and vertical.
Vertical search engines are designed to retrieve a narrower category of
content, such as photo images (e.g. Dreamstime) or travel (e.g.
Expedia). The majority of general search engines monetize the
service through selling ad placement rather than charging search users
a monetary price.6
The House Report states that, as early as 2005, Google executives recognized that
vertical “search engines could pose a threat to Google’s long-term dominance.” Id.
at 183.
Whereas Dreamstime offers one of the largest online stock photography
repositories, Google Images “is the largest repository of searchable and browsable
images in the world.” 5-ER-1019-20(¶2.a). “Image searches are critical to
Google’s online search and search ad monopoly.” Id. Consequently, “Google
Images is the most prominent subcategory within Google’s search results” and can
be accessed from a tab at the top of the results. Id. As shown in Exhibit B to the
amended complaint, Google Images enjoys a constant, unique and prominent
placement with Google’s search results when anyone performs a standard image
related search. 5-ER-1019-20(¶2.a); 5-ER-1100. A large block of evocative

6

House Report, p.77.
10
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Google Images results appears ahead of all other organic results. Id. As also
depicted in Exhibit B, this self-preferencing is “nearly identical to the Google
Shopping conduct that resulted in a record €2.42 billion fine in the European
Union in 2017.” 5-ER-1099. Google Images allows users to scroll through images
located on other websites without ever leaving Google Images. 5-ER-1025-26(¶9).
“Google profits immensely from the traffic Google Images generates,” and
“Google Images’ dominance is essential to Google’s online search dominance.” 5ER-1019-20(¶2.a).
Google Images gained its immense size by indiscriminately “scraping” and
including within its search results the content of its vertical image search
competitors (e.g., stock photography sites), as well as images published on other
websites (which were often purchased from stock photography sites). 5-ER1077(¶146). Vertical image search sites like Dreamstime only include results from
their own repositories of images they have licensed. 5-ER-1036-37(¶36).
2. Dreamstime as a Consumer-Purchaser of Advertising
Dreamstime is also a “consumer-purchaser” of Google’s search advertising
program, AdWords, through which users bid on ads appearing within Google’s
search results. 5-ER-1019-22(¶¶1-2); 5-ER-1032(¶27); 5-ER-1071-72(¶¶127-30).
Dreamstime has spent over $50 million on AdWords. 5-ER-1023-24(¶6). As
Google increases its dominance in search and search advertising, the advertising

11
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costs for vertical search rivals like Dreamstime increase. 5-ER-1065-66(¶105); 5ER-1075-76(¶¶139-40).
Of course, Google’s multiple roles in Dreamstime’s business are
interconnected. Google’s organic search results provide a gatekeeping function for
all websites, from which it diverts traffic away from Dreamstime to Google
Images. 5-ER-1028-31(¶¶19-24). Google Images presents Dreamstime’s content
within its search results in deceptive ways, erecting an even taller wall for
searchers to climb to reach Dreamstime. 5-ER-1036(¶¶ 96-97). Through the
anticompetitive conduct described below, Google deepens its pockets and builds a
virtual “walled garden”7 by keeping consumers on its properties (like Google
Images) and diverting traffic away from vertical search rivals like Dreamstime. 5ER-1019-20(¶2.a); 5-ER-1077(¶146). In addition, as a consumer, Dreamstime is
heavily reliant on Google’s ads – essentially paying Google a ransom when it was
effectively eliminated from Google’s organic results. 5-ER-1065-66(¶105); 5-ER1073(¶133).
C.

Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct

As part of its anticompetitive scheme to increase traffic to Google Images
and suppress other vertical image search websites like Dreamstime, Google

Referred to as an “economic moat” in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 5ER-1022-23(¶4).
7
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demoted Dreamstime’s online search ranking to the point of making it virtually
invisible in the most common searches for online stock photography (e.g., from
third place to 91st for “stock photos”). 5-ER-1023-46(¶¶5,8,38,40,46,53-54,60); 5ER-1075(¶139).8 While demoting Dreamstime, Google self-preferenced Google
Images in its search results as described above. 5-ER-1019-22(¶¶2.a,2.d); 5-ER1070-71(¶¶125-26).
Google built Google Images by misappropriating images from Dreamstime
(and others) and displaying them directly within Google Images, without
compensating Dreamstime. In fact, “Google primarily obtained its vertical content
through ‘scraping’ other websites. . . . When [vertical search] rivals tried to resist
Google’s efforts to copy their information, Google gave them an ‘all-or-nothing
choice’: They could either allow their content to be appropriated by Google or they
wouldn’t appear within Google web search results at all.” Lina M. Khan, “The
Separation of Platforms and Commerce” (119 Colum. L. Rev. 973, 999–1000)
(2019).
Google allowed users to unlawfully obtain Dreamstime’s images directly
from Google Images. During most of the relevant statutory period, Google
employed a “View Image” button that allowed users to open and save high-

Without justification, Google also suspended and then de-indexed Dreamstime’s
mobile app in its app store. 5-ER-1024-25(¶8); 5-ER-1077(¶145).
8

13

Case: 20-16472, 05/06/2021, ID: 12104662, DktEntry: 32, Page 27 of 82

resolution versions of Dreamstime’s images from Google Images’ results, without
ever visiting Dreamstime.com. 5-ER-1061-62(¶¶96-97); 5-ER-1077(¶146).9 This
deceived users as to the source and licensed nature of image results, encouraged
theft and captured traffic within Google’s “walled garden” that would otherwise
have visited Dreamstime.com. Id. Immediately after Google removed this single
feature, Dreamstime’s web traffic increased by 25% and its paid conversions
(sales) increased by 10%. Id. Still, confusion, theft and traffic diversion persisted.
Id.
As a result of Google’s efforts to provide all the information a searcher
sought within its own walls, by 2019 half of all Google searches ended with “no
click” to any third party site, in large part because Google gave the searcher
everything they were looking for within Google’s search results. 7-ER1633(¶101). Now most Google searches start and end within Google’s walls,
because Google presents the licensed content of other online publishers within its
search results.
Google’s search bias and self-preferencing of Google Images artificially
raised Dreamstime’s costs of competing and reduced its share of image search
traffic. 5-ER-1065-66(¶105); 5-ER-1075-76(¶¶139-40). Simultaneously, it
Google also distributed a watermark removal tool to thwart protective measures.
5-ER-1062, n.31.

9
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increased Google’s stranglehold over online search and search advertising by
cementing Google Images as the dominant place to search for and obtain images,
to the exclusion of smaller search rivals and vertical image search websites. 5-ER1026-27(¶¶10-11); 5-ER-1070-71(¶¶125-26); 5-ER-1080-81(¶¶155-56).
This bipartite elimination of Dreamstime (through organic search demotion
and diverting traffic to Google Images) foreclosed a critical distribution channel to
Dreamstime, forcing it to spend more on AdWords to compensate. 5-ER-102324(¶¶5,7); 5-ER-1048-50(¶¶63-64); 5-ER-1075(¶140). However, AdWords has
itself evolved into an unfair advertising program. 5-ER-1067(¶112); 5-ER-107374(¶¶133-137). For example: (a) AdWords’ bidding protocol (for key search
words, or “keywords”) is not objectively-based and keywords are not necessarily
awarded on a quantitative basis to the highest bidder (id.); (b) Google reserves for
itself the right to bid against others for the same keywords (5-ER-107(¶135)); and
(c) even when Dreamstime wins a bid, it overpays for AdWords and Google can
(and did) still cancel Dreamstime’s most successful ads for capricious reasons (5ER-1074(¶137); 5-ER-1076(¶143)). This hindered Dreamstime’s ability to regain
image search traffic through AdWords and enabled Google to charge
supracompetitive prices. 5-ER-1065-66(¶105); 5-ER-1076-77(¶143).
All of Google’s anticompetitive conduct is in furtherance of its aim to
collect and control as much web traffic and associated user data as possible.

15
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Google collects and uses data it has obtained from users and advertisers (and even
from its competitors’ websites), because it enables it to offer extremely targeted
ads at a supracompetitive premium, thus maintaining its search and search
advertising monopolies. 5-ER-1077-78(¶133); 5-ER-1077-78(¶147). This
valuable data – which includes search histories and patterns, spending habits,
locations, etc. – raises the already significant entry barriers and network effects in
the search advertising market and allows Google to fend off weaker
search/advertising rivals. 5-ER-1077-78(¶147). But, in order to obtain this data
advantage in search advertising, Google must eliminate specialized search threats
that are substitute starting points for users seeking specialized information. In that
sense, the totality of Google’s acts can be scrutinized as an “overall scheme” to
limit or foreclose competition in the relevant market. 5-ER-1026(¶10); 5-ER1076-77(¶143). By making itself the only place to go to find anything, Google can
record the complete behavior of more and more users. More traffic (at
Dreamstime’s and others’ expense) means more data, and more data means a
stronger search advertising monopoly for Google.
D.

Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Caused Antitrust Injury

Google’s anticompetitive conduct caused antitrust injury to Dreamstime as a
consumer-purchaser of Google’s ads and as a vertical image search rival to Google
Images, by diverting web traffic from Dreamstime and keeping it within Google’s

16
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properties (the “walled garden” effect). 5-ER-1079-81(¶¶154-58). It further
decreased competitive innovation in the relevant market which could have come
from vertical image search providers, who were substitutes for Google’s
specialized image searches and also ideal partners for Google’s search engine
rivals. 10 5-ER-1068-70(¶¶117,122).
These injuries harm competition and consumers in the relevant market, by
allowing Google to entrench its dominance, thwart competition, and stifle
innovation in this market.
II.

FACTS RELEVANT TO DREAMSTIME’S UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT CLAIMS
Google’s misconduct also violated California’s UCL and breached the

AdWords Agreement’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Dreamstime opened an AdWords account in 2004. 7-ER-1583-84(¶4).
AdWords (recently renamed Google Ads) is Google’s online advertising service
through which advertisers pay Google to place ads within Google’s search results
and on other websites. Id. The AdWords Agreement 11 contemplated that Google
DOJ Suit, ¶170; States’ Suit, ¶14 (“Specialized vertical providers. . .who offer
consumers the ability to complete a transaction then and there, do not compete in
Google’s search-related markets. Nevertheless, they pose a threat to Google’s
monopoly power in those markets because their success would both strengthen
general search rivals with whom they partner and lower the artificially high
barriers to expansion and entry that protect Google’s monopolies.”).
11
Dreamstime executed several versions of the agreement, all the same in relevant
part. 4-ER-754-65.
10

17

Case: 20-16472, 05/06/2021, ID: 12104662, DktEntry: 32, Page 31 of 82

would give Dreamstime access to the AdWords “Program” in return for
Dreamstime paying for ads Google ran. 4-ER-754-65. Importantly, the agreement
“Programs” stated that “Google and its affiliates may make available to Customer
certain optional Program features to assist Customer with the selection and
generation of Targets, 12 Ads, or Destinations.” 4-ER-754-65. However, the
agreement also contained certain “as is” disclaimers and indicated that Google
made “no guarantee” about the Program or Program results. Id.
In 2012, as part of these optional Program features, Google offered
Dreamstime a dedicated, Europe-based ad-support team (the “reps”). 7-ER1585(¶7). The reps claimed to be experts with superior knowledge and
information, and Dreamstime relied upon their stated expertise, often by giving
Google unprecedented control of its account. 7-ER-1585-86(¶¶7-8); 7-ER-161920(¶78); 2-ER-87-107(102:11-103:7), 8-ER-1681-63(¶¶10-11); 8-ER-177778(¶¶7-9). The reps intended that Dreamstime rely on their stated expertise. 7ER-1353-79(137:16-138:9); 7-ER-1380-1410(117:15-118:1); 7-ER-142967(277:20-278:19,279:2-7).
The reps misrepresented how specific advanced tools worked, as well as
their understanding of how the tools worked. They also told specific lies about

12

“Targets” is defined as “Ads trafficking or targeting decisions (e.g., keywords).”
18
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what caused Dreamstime’s organic search demotion. All of this was done with the
intent and effect of luring Dreamstime to overspend on AdWords.
A.

The Google Reps Misrepresented Dreamstime’s Drop in Organic
Rankings

Until late 2015, Dreamstime’s web traffic from Google search grew along
with its image library and business. 7-ER-1621-22(¶¶82, 84); 10-ER-2216-17. But
in late 2015, Dreamstime’s organic traffic and search ranking for common industry
terms began to drop significantly. Id. By the beginning of 2016, it was
experiencing an inexplicable and significant reduction in traffic. 7-ER-162122(¶¶81-84); 9-ER-1895(¶14); 10-ER-2147-2217.
Unbeknownst to Dreamstime, Google made a significant change to its search
algorithm in November 2015, 13 right when Dreamstime’s drop began. 9-ER-189596(¶¶14-15). In its own testing of the change, Google flagged Dreamstime’s
product page as a “

-

■

loss” (

) because of the change. 9-ER-1910(¶69); 9-ER-1966-67(6:19-7:17); 9-ER-

2083-84. Like most ecommerce sites, Dreamstime had tens of millions of product
pages with the same format as the page Google rated a “

■ loss,” because the

product pages were generated from a common template. Id. Thus, the algorithmic

There were obviously others. Because its antitrust claim was dismissed,
Dreamstime only received limited discovery related to a change in which
“Dreamstime” was specifically referenced in Google’s testing.
13
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change was likely to result in a'

■

loss" for tens of millions of Dreamstime's

pages. 9-ER-1915-16(183).
Google graded Dreamstime's page a'

■

loss" in relation to a change Google

made to its "Salient Terms" signal, a component within Google's search algorithm
that

so the algorithm can

match the page to relevant search queries. 9-ER-1906-12(ili154-73). The signal
works by
. 9-ER-191 l-12(ilil71-73); 9ER-1961-92.
Before the change, critical terms for Dreamstime' s commercial success as an
online stock photo company, including
ranked in the top six. Id. After the change, all three terms dropped out of the top
six, and other important terms were dramatically demoted and/or replaced with
meaningless numbers and very specific terms umelated to stock photography. Id.
As a result, the algorithm
, which, it follows, would affect its
perceived relevance to search queries about stock photography. 7-ER-161724(ilil71-86).14

14 After discovery dosed, Google produced different data purportedly indicating

fewer changes to the salient terms. Dreamstime sought to reopen discovery and
20
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Dreamstime’s search demotion caused a crisis. 7-ER-1622-24(¶¶84-85). In
the second half of 2016, Dreamstime expressed to high-ranking Google managers
and other reps that it suspected Dreamstime’s drop was due to an algorithmic
change. 7-ER-1263-24(¶¶85-86); 8-ER-1660-65. Google assured Dreamstime this
was not the case, and that Dreamstime’s website was likely the problem. Id. In
September 2016, after another big drop in its organic traffic and revenue,
Dreamstime met with its AdWords reps to discuss the issue. They reiterated the
problem must reside with Dreamstime. 7-ER-1624-25(¶¶86-88); 8-ER-1666-69.
In October 2016, Dreamstime emailed Google that it had “reached the point
where we ask ourselves whether it makes sense to continue to invest in AdWords. .
.” 7-ER-1625-26(¶¶89-90), 8-ER-1666-69. This was not a threat but a practical
reality due to Dreamstime’s diminished organic search traffic. Immediately after
receiving this email, the reps emailed one another expressing great concern that
Dreamstime might slow its AdWords spending. 7-ER-1517-34,1538-41. Though
Google claims it has a strict wall of separation between its ad and search services,
the reps decided to answer Dreamstime’s organic questions with lies and half-truths
to induce it to continue its AdWords spending. 7-ER-1623-31(¶¶85-96); 7-ER1632-33(¶¶99-100); 3-ER-521-26; 3-ER-531-43.

the court refused, leaving disputed facts as to how the terms changed. 10-ER2396-2413; 4-ER-842-43.
21
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Google chose an “outside” expert, Professor Mario Fischer, to analyze
purported reasons for Dreamstime’s organic traffic drop, but Google vetted
Fischer’s analysis before providing it to Dreamstime. 7-ER-1535-37; 7-ER-154241; 7-ER-1627-28(¶93); 3-ER-521-26. Google knew Dreamstime suspected an
algorithmic change, but it did not provide Fischer any information about Google
algorithmic changes. 7-ER-1535-36; 7-ER-1543-49. Unsurprisingly, his analysis
did not address the 2015 algorithmic change. At deposition, Google admitted it in
fact had tools to

but

it did not use these tools to answer Dreamstime’s questions. 9-ER-1921-22(¶¶100103); 9-ER-1942-59(21:24-22:12).
Before sending Fischer’s analysis to Dreamstime, Google’s rep made sure it
matched what a Google search employee had told Dreamstime on a public forum
(specifically, that Dreamstime’s website content could be improved). 7-ER-1543;
3-ER-525. She then emailed her manager to report she had an answer to give
Dreamstime and that she hoped to “keep the revenue at a pretty high level.” 7-ER1541. Clearly, Google’s concern was with Dreamstime’s AdWords spending, not
its search performance.
Google emailed the Fischer analysis to Dreamstime, touting Fischer as “one
of the highest rated specialists” in the market and noting that Fischer confirmed
Google’s answer to Dreamstime on a public forum. 2-ER-165-66. The analysis
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ruled out some publicly disclosed algorithmic changes (not the November 2015
change), concluding that Dreamstime’s content was the most likely cause and
recommending that Dreamstime add to and vary the content on its product pages.
7-ER-1628-29(¶94); 2-ER-151-160; 9-ER-1920-21(¶¶98-100).15 At deposition, a
Google search employee disagreed that this recommendation was likely to improve
Dreamstime’s search performance. 9-ER-1927(¶121); 9-ER-1565-1576(174:2178:7).
The analysis did not indicate that Google had failed to examine Google’s
prior algorithmic changes, or that this expert was kept in the dark as to such
changes. 7-ER-1628-29(¶94); 2-ER-151-160. The message to Dreamstime was
clear: the issue is your weak content (not Google’s algorithm), so keep spending on
AdWords while you fix it. Id. Of course, neither Fischer nor the reps explained
why Dreamstime’s content had not been an issue prior to November 2015. 2-ER151-160; 2-ER-165-66. 16

Google argued below that other issues besides the content on Dreamstime’s
product pages was to blame, but Fischer eliminated many of those. 2-ER-151-160;
9-ER-1919-21(¶¶94-100).
16
Dreamstime also raised these issues to executives at Google’s headquarters with
more direct access to “relevant search product folks.” 7-ER-1488-90; 7-ER14911503; 7-ER-1629(¶95); 3-ER-527-30; 9-ER-1879-87. After consulting with
lawyers for Google’s search team, they reiterated Google’s prior message. 3-ER527-30.
15
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Dreamstime’s testifying organic search expert, Jessie Stricchiola, analyzed
Dreamstime’s historical website and search performance in light of Google’s
discovery responses and depositions. 9-ER-1894-95(¶10). She declared that the
2015 algorithmic change (or one similar to it) was the most likely cause of
Dreamstime’s search demotion. 9-ER-1909-1918(¶¶67-88); 9-ER-1928.
Dreamstime relied on Google’s misrepresentations by investing millions
more into AdWords and website upgrades. 7-ER-1629-31(¶¶96-97). Ultimately,
the fixes failed and Dreamstime continued to lose traffic. Id.
B.

Google Reps Made Misrepresentations Regarding AdWords

The district court did not analyze Dreamstime’s extensive evidence of
AdWords-related fraud, because it erroneously relied on contractual disclaimers to
summarily adjudicate Dreamstime’s AdWords-related fraud claims. 1-ER-20-21.
However, Dreamstime provided three detailed declarations demonstrating several
significant instances over multiple years in which Google reps misrepresented facts
about how certain AdWords program features worked to induce Dreamstime to
overspend on them. 7-ER-1592-1620; 8-ER-1685-98(¶¶19-49); 8-ER-1778-90.
Internal communications and deposition testimony of Google reps show their
fraudulent intent.
For example, in 2014, Google reps convinced Dreamstime, through deceit,
to switch to a new smart bidding strategy, called Target ROAS (Return on Ad
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Spend). This switch drastically reduced the quality of traffic Dreamstime received
from AdWords and drastically increased Dreamstime’s AdWords costs. 7-ER1591-1605; 8-ER-1778-82. For years, Dreamstime had been using another smart
bidding strategy called “Conversion Optimizer” and was achieving its desired costper-acquisition (“CPA”) of $60-$70. 7-ER-1587-88(¶10). Before the switch,
Dreamstime defined an “acquisition” or “conversion” as an actual purchase, which
made sense for its business. 7-ER-1584-85(¶6); 7-ER-1593-94(¶¶21-22); 8-ER1779-80(¶¶12-13). At the time, Dreamstime’s CPA measured how much it paid
for each purchase it got from AdWords.
To induce Dreamstime to switch to Target ROAS, Google’s reps falsely told
Dreamstime that: (a) the reps were well-trained on Target ROAS and fully
understood how it worked; (b) free sign-ups to Dreamstime’s website had to be
counted (along with purchases) as conversions across all accounts to activate
Target ROAS; (c) these changes were just a “test” that could be reversed without
lasting damage to the account or existing ads; and (d) the reps were “convinced”
the changes fit within Dreamstime’s advertising strategy and budget constraints.
8-ER-1779-80(¶¶13-14); 7-ER-1592-95(¶¶18-25); 7-ER-356; 7-ER-357-364.
These were intentional misrepresentations to induce Dreamstime to overspend on
AdWords.
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Though Google reps assured Dreamstime they understood the new
technology, their own internal emails with Google’s tech support contain several
candid admissions that they did not understand how it worked. 7-ER-1600(¶¶3637); 7-ER-1601-02(¶40); 7-ER-1603-04(¶43); 7-ER-1635-41; 3-ER-419-22. Also,
one of the reps admitted he knew at that time that Target ROAS did not require
sign-ups to be counted, as Google had told Dreamstime. 7-ER-1429-67(136:24138:19).
The change was not an easily reversible “test,” as the reps falsely claimed.
7-ER-1601-03(¶¶40-42). When Dreamstime switched back to Conversion
Optimizer, one of the reps who sold the product admitted that “[c]hanging the
bidding manner has reset somehow the information used by the system to estimate
the conversion opportunities of every word.” 7-ER-1601-03(¶¶40-42); 8-ER1782(¶17). Conversion Optimizer had to start over, and all of the historical data it
had built for years to meet Dreamstime’s $60-$70 CPA was lost, to devastating
effects. Id. Knowing this, the rep continued to project confidence in the tool to
Dreamstime. Id. Finally, the rep admitted internally (but did not share) that, “the
performance is terrible,” “[t]he CPA is 100 times higher,” “the conversion rate is
really really low,” and “I can’t figure out why.” 7-ER-1639-41. In the end,
Dreamstime’s average CPA skyrocketed and never returned below $70 as the
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system “re-learned,” causing it to overpay for ads by millions of dollars. 7-ER1604(¶44); 8-ER-1782(¶17).
Google reps also lured Dreamstime to overspend on another sophisticated
machine-learning tool, dynamic remarketing display ads, that aimed to show a user
an ad with an image the user previously viewed when visiting Dreamstime.com. 7ER-1605-14; 8-ER-1782-86. To induce Dreamstime to overspend on these ads, the
reps misrepresented that a very limited image feed from which the redisplayed
images were selected was sufficient and continued to do so even after Google’s
internal tech support told them it was not. 7-ER-1353-1379(218:19-25); 7-ER1606-07(¶¶48-49); 7-ER-1608-10(¶¶53-54); 3-ER-444; 3-ER-447-50; 3-ER-48389; 9-ER-2125-27; 9-ER-2132-35. They also falsely claimed the tool would only
display the exact same or a very similar image to the one the user had viewed. 7ER-1606-08(¶¶49-52); 3-ER-444 (“the exact image or category of images”). At
deposition, a rep admitted she knew that the tool would display a completely
unrelated image if no similar image was in the feed. 7-ER-1353-1379(178:9179:20); 7-ER-1608-10(¶¶53-54); 8-ER-1783-84(¶20). Finally, after Dreamstime
switched to a competitor’s tool, a Google rep misrepresented Google’s ability to
provide a feed with all of Dreamstime’s images. 7-ER-1380-1410(183:24-184:22);
7-ER-1612-13(¶¶59-61); 7-ER-1642-45; 8-ER-1785(¶23).
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These are but a few examples of knowingly false and/or reckless
misrepresentations made with the goal (and effect) of increasing Dreamstime’s
AdWords costs (and the reps’ bonuses). 2-ER-108-20(31:12-14,69:4-10); 7-ER1353-79(81:17-24); 7-ER-1380-1410(76:9-77:7); 7-ER-1429-67(77:6-17,78:22);
7-ER-1468-87(117:17-118:22). The record is replete with many other intentional
misrepresentations by Google about how certain ad tools worked. See, 7-ER1615-17; 8-ER-1689-98(¶¶27-49); 8-ER-1711; 8-ER-1753-57; 8-ER-178687(¶¶26-29); 3-ER-586-92; 3-ER-600; 3-ER-612-15 (misrepresentations about
HTML5 banner ads); 8-ER-1703-04(¶¶61-64); 8-ER-1787-90(¶¶30-35); 7-ER1614-15 (misrepresentations about foreign localized ads).
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 28, 2018, Dreamstime filed its original complaint against Google

for: (1) Sherman Act Section 2 violations; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) UCL violations. 5-ER1208-09.
On June 4, 2018, Google moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 6-ER-1349. On September 6, 2018, at the conclusion of oral
argument, the trial court gave Dreamstime a deadline of noon the next day to elect
to amend its complaint or to stand on the original pleading without further
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opportunity to amend. 1-ER-41; 5-ER-1203-06. The court did not notify
Dreamstime of any deficiencies in the original complaint. Id.
Dreamstime filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) asserting the same
causes of action on September 28, 2018. 5-ER-1017-1152. On October 19, 2018,
Google moved to dismiss the FAC. 6-ER-1347. On January 28, 2019, the trial
court granted the motion as to Dreamstime’s antitrust claim with prejudice and
denied it as to the other claims. 1-ER-22-40.
On April 24, 2020, Google moved for summary judgment as to the
remaining claims. 6-ER-1339. On July 3, 2020, the trial court granted Google’s
motion in its entirety and entered judgment. 1-ER-2-21. Dreamstime timely filed
its notice of appeal on July 30, 2020. 6-ER-1318-27.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Dreamstime plausibly stated a claim for unlawful monopolization
pursuant to Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Google is a monopolist in the online
search and search advertising market. The district court incorrectly found that
Dreamstime failed to plausibly alleged any anticompetitive conduct because it did
not sell search advertising and thus had not alleged “harm to competition.”
But Dreamstime is both a consumer in the online search advertising market
and competes with Google Images as a vertical image search provider. Its injury
flows from Google’s unlawful maintenance of its monopoly. Dreamstime
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plausibly alleged several anticompetitive acts by Google of the type that regulatory
agencies and governmental bodies throughout the world have recognized to be
anticompetitive. These acts include (among others) demotion of Dreamstime and
simultaneous self-preferencing of Google Images in search results,
misappropriation of Dreamstime’s content for display within Google Images and
imposition of a rigged and unfair AdWords program. This conduct allowed
Google to unlawfully divert traffic from Dreamstime to Google and extend its
search advertising monopoly.
By entrenching its “walled garden” monopoly, Google eliminated a source
of innovation and competition, reduced consumer choice and artificially increased
costs for all market participants.
2. The district court abused its discretion by denying Dreamstime
amendment of its antitrust claim without having first provided any notice of the
court’s perceived deficiencies. Dreamstime could (if allowed) have alleged a
market for online image search services, wherein Google Images dominates and
Dreamstime directly competes.
3. Against California law, the district court erred by disposing of
Dreamstime’s AdWords-related UCL-fraud claims based solely on contractual
disclaimers. Cal. Civ. Code § 1668. The district court erroneously disposed of
Dreamstime’s other UCL claims by making case dispositive factual findings,
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weighing evidence and making credibility determinations to avoid a trial.
Dreamstime raised triable issues as to whether Google defrauded it with respect to
AdWords and the reasons for Dreamstime’s search demotion.
Google’s conduct was also “unfair” pursuant to the UCL.
4. The district court erred in summarily adjudicating Dreamstime’s breach
of implied covenant claim. The AdWords Agreement gave Google the discretion
to provide premium ad support services to Dreamstime, which it did. Google
therefore had an implied duty to avoid acting in a way that compromised the
performance of the contract. Dreamstime raised triable issues as to whether
Google breached the implied covenant through systematic misrepresentations and
other conduct.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DREAMSTIME’S
ANTITRUST CLAIM
A.

Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

The appellate court reviews de novo dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Crowley v. Nevada ex. rel. Nev. Sec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730,
736 (9th Cir. 2012). This Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true,
construing them “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Keates v.
Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Finally, courts should allow a complaint to proceed even if
31
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the plaintiff is unlikely to ultimately prevail. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007); Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
B.

Dreamstime Plausibly Stated a Claim for Unlawful
Monopolization

A claim for monopolization has three requisite elements: “(1) the defendant
possesses monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) the defendant has willfully
acquired or maintained that power; and (3) the defendant’s conduct has caused
antitrust injury.” Cost Mgmt. Servs, Inc., v. Wash. Nat. Gas Co., 99 F.3d 939, 949
(9th Cir. 1996). Whether conduct is anticompetitive and causes antitrust injury are
paradigmatic fact issues. See Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Commc’ns, 909 F.2d
1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 1990); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d
979, 989 (9th Cir. 2000).
The court took no issue with Dreamstime’s relevant market definition and
Google’s monopoly power (elements Google did not seriously challenge). 1-ER29. Also, Dreamstime clearly had standing as a consumer of AdWords and a
vertical image search service that posed a competitive threat to Google Images.
Nevertheless, because Dreamstime did not sell search advertising, the district court
reasoned there could be no “harm to competition” in any relevant market. 1-ER32-34. This was error.
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Vertical search services, by filling a specialized need, provide the same
function as a critical feature of Google’s general search, but in a more innovative
way. Dreamstime offers a specialized search from tens of millions of high-quality,
pre-licensed images and videos, avoiding the confusion and copyright issues
inherent in Google Images. 5-ER-1019-22(¶¶2.c-2.d). Whether they are potential
partners with current rivals, 17 potential rivals, 18 or simply a superior substitute
starting point for specialized searches, vertical search providers like Dreamstime
are an important source of competition and innovation, and their suppression or
elimination buttresses Google search and search advertising monopolies.
1. Dreamstime Sufficiently Alleged Google Had Monopoly Power in a
Viable Relevant Market
Dreamstime alleged that the relevant product/service markets for its
monopolization claim were the online search market or online search advertising
market (which Dreamstime alleged were really one and the same). 5-ER-102831(¶¶18-26). Dreamstime also plausibly alleged that Google has monopoly power
in the relevant market. 5-ER-1029-31(¶¶ 21,23,25); 5-ER-1069-70(¶¶120-22).
See e.g. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th

States’ Suit, ¶14.
DOJ Suit, ¶170; House Report, p.183 (“Google’s conduct helped maintain its
monopoly in online search and search advertising, while dissuading investment in
nascent competitors, undermining innovation, and harming users and businesses
alike.”)

17
18
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Cir. 1997); see also Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th
Cir. 1995). Neither Google nor the district court seriously challenged these
elements.

2. Dreamstime Alleged Standing as a Consumer and/or Participant in the
Relevant Market
Section 4 of the Clayton Act confers standing to “any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws.” 15 U.S.C. §15(a). The Supreme Court counsels that Section 4 “does not
confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to
sellers.” Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). The Act is
“comprehensive,” “protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices
by whomever they may be perpetrated.” Id.
The district court’s ruling does not directly address “antitrust standing,”
focusing instead on a vaguely explained notion of “harm to competition.” In any
event, Dreamstime plausibly alleged it had antitrust standing due to its status as a
“consumer-purchaser” of Google’s AdWords services and/or as a specialized
image search service that competes with Google Images for the same traffic. 5ER-1019-22(¶¶1-2); 5-ER-1032(¶27); 5-ER-1071-72(¶¶127-30); see e.g. Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 340-41 (1979) (consumers have standing); Am. Ad
Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (broker of
34
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advertising services who was not a consumer or competitor, had standing as a
“participant”); Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951
F.2d 1158, 1159-64 (9th Cir. 1991); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1509-10
(9th Cir. 1996); In re Netflix Antitrust Litig., 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (purchasers had standing); Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp.,
772 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (purchasers had standing); In re eBay
Seller Antitrust Litig., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(vendors/consumers had standing).
The district court held that Dreamstime could not maintain an antitrust claim
because it does not directly compete with Google in search advertising – i.e.,
because it is not selling search-based ads. This conclusion ignores two important
points. First, Dreamstime defined the relevant market as both search and search
advertising (that they were one and the same). The court’s ruling focuses on the
advertising but not the search; it ignores that Dreamstime does provide image
search, even if it does not compete with Google in the sale of ads.
Second, there is no requirement that Dreamstime be a direct “competitor” to
Google to have standing. See e.g. McCready, 457 U.S. at 479-81, 483-84. In
McCready, a member of a group health plan had standing to sue an insurer and a
conspiring organization of psychiatrists for antitrust violations because “the injury
she suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to
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inflict” in the relevant market. Id. at 484; see also Am. Ad Mgmt., 190 F.3d at 1057
(“The Supreme Court has never imposed a ‘consumer or competitor’ test but has
instead held the antitrust laws are not so limited.”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
505 F.3d 302, 310-20 (4th Cir. 2007) (non-competitor of Microsoft had standing);
Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 172-77 (3rd
Cir. 2015).
3. Dreamstime Plausibly Alleged Exclusionary and/or Predatory Acts by
Google
The “conduct” element of a Section 2 claim requires that the monopolist act
“to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor.” Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1208. “Exclusionary conduct refers to
practices that unreasonably or unnecessarily impede fair competition; that is
conduct that impairs the efforts of others to compete for customers in an
unnecessarily restrictive way.” Id. at 1211 n.6. “[T]he [Sherman Act] directs itself
. . . against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.” United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985).
Because of the dangerous power monopolists possess, even independently
lawful practices violate Section 2 if they unreasonably exclude or foreclose
competition. Aspen, at 608-11; Greyhound Comput. Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d
488, 498 (9th Cir. 1977); 5-ER-1079(¶151). In other words, Google may not
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engage in conduct which may be permissible for its much smaller rivals. Finally,
whether the “conduct” under scrutiny is exclusionary or anticompetitive is a
question of fact. See e.g. Movie 1 & 2, 909 F.2d at 1245.
In ruling that Dreamstime had not plausibly alleged actionable
anticompetitive conduct, the district court erred by: (a) refusing to accept
Dreamstime’s allegations as true or construe them in its favor (Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2009)), (b) improperly deciding fact issues
(In re Gilead Sci. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)), and (c)
improperly rejecting Dreamstime’s allegations as to how Google’s conduct was
anticompetitive (which were at least as plausible as Google’s justifications) (Starr,
652 F.3d at 1216-17).
As detailed below, Dreamstime provided several plausible allegations as to
Google’s anticompetitive conduct, how this conduct impacted Dreamstime, and
how it harmed competition in the relevant market. This same or similar conduct
was and is the subject of governmental investigations and lawsuits initiated by the
DOJ and most of the States.19 The district court’s rejection of Dreamstime’s
conduct allegations gives no deference to Fed.R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2) or controlling
antitrust precedent, warranting reversal.
i.
19

Google Demoted Dreamstime and Simultaneously SelfPreferenced Google Images in Its Organic Search Results

See Footnotes 3-4, supra.
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During the relevant period, Google demoted Dreamstime’s online search
ranking to the point of making it virtually invisible in results for the most common
searches for online stock photography. 5-ER-1023-25(¶¶5,8); 5-ER-103747(¶¶38,40,44,46,53-54,60); 5-ER-1075(¶139); 5-ER-1077(¶144). This caused
Dreamstime to spend more on AdWords, because it relies heavily on Google for
traffic.20 5-ER-1023-24(¶¶ 5,7); 5-ER-1033(¶29); 5-ER-1048-50(¶¶63-64); 5-ER1075(¶140). Simultaneously, Google self-preferenced Google Images, by
providing it unique, static placement at the top of all image-related results and
other unique features (e.g., evocative blocks of thumbnails of its results within
search results). 5-ER-1019-20(¶2.a); 5-ER-1035(¶35).
Dreamstime alleged Google’s search bias and self-preferencing of Google
Images harmed competition by diverting web traffic from Dreamstime to Google
Images, increasing Google’s stranglehold over the online search advertising
market. 5-ER-1019-22(¶¶2.a,2.d); 5-ER-1065-66(¶105); 5-ER-1070-71(¶¶125-26);
5-ER-1075-76(¶¶139-40).

The House Report states that several competitors and specialized search
providers similarly described a near-complete reliance on Google for traffic due to
its monopoly position. House Report, p.181.

20
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The House Report similarly reported:
Numerous market participants noted that Google’s favoring of its own
sites and demoting those of third parties has effectively increased their
cost of distribution. Since demoted sites can generally only recover
traffic through advertising on Google, the platform “essentially
requires competitors to pay for their websites to appear above
Google’s own link” . . .
*

*

*

Meanwhile, Google’s own competing vertical “is always at the top” of
search results. The incident highlights how demoting rivals can
enrich Google in two ways: first, through diverting greater traffic and
business to its own products; and second, through earning revenues
from the penalized [vertical] sites that are subsequently scrambling to
recover their search placement. When demoting firms that Google
views as actual or potential competitive threats, Google is effectively
raising rivals’ costs.
House Report, p.191-92. The House Report further identifies the injuries to
Dreamstime and competition from this conduct:
[O]nce Google built out its vertical offerings, it introduced various
changes that had the effect of privileging Google’s own inferior
services while demoting competitors’ offerings. This conduct has
undermined the vertical search providers [and] boosted Google’s ad
revenue by keeping users on Google’s domains for longer and by
compelling demoted firms to pay Google more ad fees to reach users.
House Report, p.187. This conduct diverted Dreamstime’s share of web traffic to
Google Images and increased Dreamstime’s costs, thereby eliminating a source of
innovation in image search and a potential partner to Google’s search rivals.
Simultaneously, it injured competition in the relevant market by erecting a “walled
garden” around Google that kept users (and their data) within Google and off of
39
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Google’s rivals or vertical search alternatives. 5-ER-1075-76(¶¶139-40); 5-ER1080(¶155).
Thus, the trial court erred in finding that this conduct did not harm
competition in the relevant market and therefore did not constitute anticompetitive
conduct. See e.g. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64-66 (Microsoft’s act of binding its
browser product to its operating system (“OS”) to eliminate rival browsers was
anticompetitive because “through something other than competition on the merits
[it] has the effect of significantly reducing usage of rivals’ products and hence
protecting [Microsoft’s] own operating system monopoly”).
ii.

Through Google Images, Google Misappropriated and
Displayed Licensed Images from Dreamstime’s Website
which Diverted Traffic and Customers from Dreamstime

As part of its anticompetitive scheme to maintain its “walled garden,”
Google stole images from Dreamstime and others and displayed those images
within Google Images without compensation. 5-ER-1061-62(¶¶96-97); 5-ER1077(¶146). This “diverted [Dreamstime’s] actual and potential customers” from
Dreamstime.com and to Google Images and deceived users as to the source of
images, encouraging theft. 5-ER-1077(¶146). Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76-77
(though rival Java providers did not compete in Microsoft’s monopoly market,
deceptive conduct toward Java developers, which reduced Java providers’ shares
and buttressed Microsoft’s monopoly, was anticompetitive).
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The House Report identifies how Google built its own vertical services in
part “through lifting content directly from third-party providers to bootstrap
Google’s own vertical services.” House Report, pp.184-85. It further details the
harm to competition from this conduct:
Google’s practice of misappropriating third-party content to bootstrap
its own rival search services and to keep users on Google’s own
webpage is further evidence of its monopoly power and an example
of how Google has abused that power. Google seized value from
third-party businesses without their consent. These businesses had no
effective choice but to allow Google’s misappropriation to continue,
given Google’s search dominance. In this way, Google leveraged its
search dominance to misappropriate third-party content, free riding on
others’ investments and innovations.
House Report, p.188 (emphasis added).21 This harm to vertical search providers
suppresses competition in online search by entrenching Google’s capture of all
web traffic and its associated data, reducing traffic to Google rivals and reducing
innovation among rivals and potential rivals in general search. 5-ER-106566(¶105); 5-ER-1070-71(¶¶125-26); 5-ER-1079-81(¶¶152-57). Google obtains
third-party content through an ultimatum that only a monopolist can make: allow
your content to be scraped or do not appear in search results. This conduct, by

The House Report adds: “Through misappropriating third-party content and
giving preferential treatment to its own vertical sites, Google abused its gatekeeper
power over online search to coerce websites to surrender valuable data and to
leverage its search dominance into adjacent markets. Google’s conduct both
thwarted competition and diminished the incentive of vertical providers to invest in
new and innovative offerings.” House Report, p.194.

21
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“something other than competition on the merits, has the effect of significantly
reducing usage of rivals’ products and hence protecting [the] monopoly.”
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65. Thus, it is anticompetitive. Id.
The district court did not directly state why this conduct is not
anticompetitive. At the very least, it plausibly is.
iii.

Google’s AdWords Program is Rigged and Spawns
Monopoly Pricing

To try to regain the visibility Dreamstime lost due to Google’s demotion of
it and self-preferencing of Google Images, Dreamstime bought more AdWords. 5ER-1065-66(¶105); 5-ER-1074-75(¶138). But AdWords was deeply tainted by
conflicts of interest for Google. Driven by Google’s monopoly, AdWords has
evolved into a skewed and unfair advertising program. 5-ER-1067-68(¶112); 5ER-1073-74(¶¶133-34, 136). It is a “black box” in which keywords are not
necessarily awarded to the highest bidder, Google can bid against any bidder, and
Google can cancel winning ads for arbitrary reasons (something Dreamstime
alleged it did). 5-ER-1051(¶69); 5-ER-1067-68(¶112); 5-ER-1073-74(¶¶13335,137); 5-ER-1076-77(¶143).
The House Report, corroborating Dreamstime’s allegations herein, further
explained the myriad ways AdWords evolved to raise prices for ad customers.
House Report, p.197. All of this “undermined competition, misled consumers, and
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degraded the overall quality of Google’s search results – all while enabling Google
to further exploit its monopoly over general online search.” Id.
The district court speculated that this conduct “is more likely to steer
customers towards existing rivals,” and that “it does not make sense” that Google
would risk losing a customer.22 1-ER-32-34. This ignores that Google, as a
monopolist, can raise prices without losing customers. More importantly, this is
improper fact-finding: “[i]f there are two alternative explanations . . . both of
which are plausible, plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion to dismiss . . .” Starr,
652 F.3d at 1216.
iv.

Google Unlawfully Captured Private Data to Bolster its
Monopoly

Dreamstime plausibly alleged that Google unlawfully accessed user and
competitor data for anticompetitive means. In fact, each of the acts above were
motivated by Google’s goal of entrenching its monopoly through the mass
collection of user data. Data is Google’s most valued asset, and a pillar of its
market power. More traffic (from Dreamstime and other rivals) means more data,
and more data means more advertising revenues, higher entry barriers, increased
network effects and less competition from weaker rivals in the search advertising

The Supreme Court observed: “[N]o monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing.” Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602 n.28.

22
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market. 5-ER-1029-30(¶22); 5-ER-1064(¶102); 5-ER-1077-78(¶147).23 As the
House Report noted: “Each of its services provides Google with a trove of user
data reinforcing its dominance across markets. Through linking these services
together, Google increasingly functions as an ecosystem of interlocking
monopolies.” House Report, p.15. The district court acknowledged that “data
collection gives Google an advantage” over its rivals but found “a monopolist
utilizing its competitive advantage does not equate to anticompetitive conduct.” 1ER-34. This again is improper fact-finding. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608-11.24
v.

Google’s Acts Comprised an Overall Scheme and Should be
Assessed in Their Entirety

The Supreme Court mandates that an alleged antitrust violator’s acts be
considered together in the “conduct” analysis. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 707 (1962) (factual components of an
antitrust case must be viewed as a “whole” rather than analyzed in isolation;
independently legal acts “lose that character when they become elements of an
unlawful scheme.”). Indeed, Dreamstime need not “prove that each allegedly

See Nathan Newman, “Search, Antitrust, And the Economics Of The Control Of
User Data” (31 Yale J. on Reg. 401, 435-440) (detailed discussion of Google’s
unlawful data use and how it entrenches Google’s search advertising monopoly).
24
Google’s other anticompetitive acts include suspending and de-indexing
Dreamstime’s mobile app, eliminating it from view in its app store for the most
relevant search. 5-ER-1024-25(¶8); 5-ER-1077(¶145).
23
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anticompetitive act was itself sufficient to demonstrate an abuse of monopoly
power.” Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 599. Further, it is not “proper to focus on
specific individual acts of an accused monopolist while refusing to consider their
overall combined [or synergistic] effect . . .” City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1982). Viewed together, the panoply of Google
acts detailed above constituted an unlawful scheme.
Accordingly, the district court erred in finding Dreamstime had not plausibly
alleged any anticompetitive conduct or an overall anticompetitive scheme.
4. Dreamstime Plausibly Alleged Antitrust Injury to It in the Relevant
Market
There is no “competitor” requirement for antitrust injury. Antitrust injury
includes any “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). This Circuit has repeatedly found
that consumers and other “non-competitor” participants in the relevant market can
suffer antitrust injury. See e.g., Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix, 352 F.3d 367,
372 (9th Cir. 2003); Am. Ad Mgmt., 190 F.3d at 1057; see also In re Netflix Litig.,
506 F. Supp. 2d at 315. Dreamstime amply met that requirement as an injured
consumer or vertical image search provider in the relevant market.
Dreamstime was a consumer of Google ads and relied heavily on Google for
traffic. As such, it may assert antitrust injury. “[B]ecause the Sherman Act’s
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concern is consumer welfare, antitrust injury occurs . . . when the claimed injury
flows from acts harmful to consumers.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1445; see also Glen
Holly, 352 F.2d at 378; Theme Promotions, Inc. v. New Am. Mktg. FSI., 546 F.3d
991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).
Dreamstime also participated in the relevant market to the extent that it was
a vertical search competitive threat to Google Images. While the court focused
only on advertising and ignored Dreamstime’s specialize role in online search, the
fact remains that Dreamstime does what Google Images does, for the same users,
in a better and safer way. 5-ER-1021(¶2.c); 5-ER-1044(¶¶55-56).
Finally, Dreamstime plausibly alleged antitrust injury under the Supreme
Court’s “inextricably intertwined” doctrine. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 471-85; 5ER-1019-22(¶¶1-2); 5-ER-1036-37(¶36). Google’s scheme to increase the
dominance of Google Images to the exclusion of specialized image search
providers, like Dreamstime, built a “walled garden” around Google, making it
more impervious to innovation and competition from current and would-be rivals.
In McCready, defendants injured competition in the market for psychotherapy
services by first injuring their rivals’ consumers. Here, Google’s injured
competition in its search monopoly by first diverting traffic and data away from
Dreamstime to Google Images. Dreamstime’s content became Google Images’
content, Dreamstime’s traffic became Google’s traffic (and data), and Google’s
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search advertising monopoly grew. There is no logical separation between
Dreamstime’s injuries, Google’s enhanced monopoly power and harm to
competition in the relevant market. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64-66, 76-77
(anticompetitive conduct targeted at non-OS competitors Java and Netscape
maintained monopoly in OS market).
Dreamstime alleged several antitrust injuries to itself, consumers and
Google’s rivals, which occurred in the relevant market, including:
(a) as a gateway to the Internet, Google throttles traffic and diverts it from
competing websites, including image search websites like Dreamstime;
(b) Google Images is specifically designed to thwart consumers from passing
through to other image search websites like Dreamstime;
(c) competition for online search and distribution of images has been
restricted with the handicapping of vertical search threats;
(d) Google’s capture of traffic allows it to widen the chasm between it and
its general search rivals through the accumulation of consumer data,
which fuels its advertising empire;
(e) potential alternate online search channels can no longer emerge (e.g.,
through partnerships between Google’s general search rivals and vertical
image search sites);

47

Case: 20-16472, 05/06/2021, ID: 12104662, DktEntry: 32, Page 61 of 82

(f) availability of competitively-priced online advertising has been reduced
and/or eliminated; and
(g) consumer access to Dreamstime’s higher quality, licensable image
services has been artificially reduced. 5-ER-1022-23(¶¶4-5); 5-ER1026-27(¶¶10-11); 5-ER-1032-33(¶28); 5-ER-1045-46(¶59); 5-ER-106162(¶¶96-97); 5-ER-1079-81(¶¶154-57).
The district court misinterpreted Dreamstime’s FAC as alleging “harm” only
to Dreamstime. 1-ER-31-32. At best, this was improper fact-finding. See e.g.
Knevelbaard, 232 F.3d at 989.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
AMENDMENT BEFORE ITS FIRST REASONED ORDER
A.

Standard of Review for Denial of Leave to Amend

A trial court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Chappel v. Lab’y Corp., 232 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2000).
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Refusing Amendment

The trial court improperly denied Dreamstime an informed amendment of its
antitrust claim, ignoring Rule 15’s mandate that amendment should be allowed
unless it is futile, causes undue prejudice or is sought in bad faith. Id.; DCD
Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 190 (9th Cir. 1987).
At the end of oral argument on Google’s first motion to dismiss, the trial
court stated it had “read some of the Briefs” and had “draft opinions ready to go.”
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5-ER-1203-04. However, it refused to share the draft opinions. Id. It then offered
Dreamstime a Hobson’s choice: it could elect to amend by noon on the next day,
otherwise any dismissal the court entered would be with prejudice. Id.
Dreamstime told the court it was “concerned what the Court’s views are on where
we might need to fill in some blanks or beef something up.” 5-ER-1205. But the
court refused to state any deficiencies. 5-ER-1205-6. Dreamstime reluctantly
elected to amend and the court dismissed the amended antitrust claims with
prejudice. 6-ER-1348.
In Lorely Financing (Jersey) No. 3 Limited v. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC,
797 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit reversed a denial of leave to
amend under similar circumstances. There, after letter briefs and a pre-motion
conference, the district court granted plaintiffs leave to amend but cautioned that it
would permit no further amendment. Plaintiffs chose not to amend, and the court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Second Circuit disapproved:
The impropriety occurred not when the district court held the premotion conference but when, in the course of the conference, it
presented Plaintiffs with a Hobson’s choice. . .Without the benefit of
a ruling, many a plaintiff will not see the necessity of amendment or
be in a position to weigh the practicality and possible means of
curing specific deficiencies.
Lorely, 797 F.3d at 190.
The Second Circuit held that the procedure “denied Plaintiffs the
opportunity to demonstrate that their claims deserve to be decided on the merits.”
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Id. at 191; see also Cresci v. Mohawk Valley Comty. Coll., 9 Fed. App’x 21, 24-25
(2d Cir. 2017) (“the District Court’s ruling, not the defendant’s arguments [put] a
plaintiff on notice of the complaint’s deficiencies”); Kopchik v. Town of East
Fishkill, New York, 759 Fed. App’x 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2018).
Here, the district court’s mandate that there can only be one amendment and
one ruling frustrates Rule 15’s purpose, “to facilitate decision on the merits, rather
than on the pleadings or technicalities.” DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186
(reversing denial of leave to file Fourth Amended Complaint) (quoting United
States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)). The district court abused its
discretion in placing an erroneous “one amendment” limitation on Rule 15.
Amendment would not have been futile. Dreamstime’s allegations already
made clear that it provided a similar service to, and competed for the same web
traffic as, Google Images. 5-ER-1019-22(¶2). The court reasoned that
Dreamstime could not allege “harm to competition” in the relevant market because
it did not sell advertising. This reasoning was legal error. However, a simple
amendment to allege that Dreamstime and Google Images do both compete in an
alternative market for image search services, and that Google unlawfully maintains
a monopoly in this market, would address any purported deficiency.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A.

Standard of Review for Summary Judgment

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Sandoval v. Cty. of
Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018). This Court determines, “viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the
relevant substantive law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,
306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc.,
251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001)); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[I]f a rational trier of fact
might resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must
be denied.”).
B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the
“Fraud” Prong of Dreamstime’s UCL Claims

In disposing of Dreamstime’s UCL-fraud claims, the district court
improperly made case dispositive factual findings on a disputed record, weighed
the evidence and made credibility determinations to avoid a trial. Each step of the
way, the district court accepted at face value Google’s version of events and
blatantly disregarded the cogent evidence Dreamstime proffered. It also made
errors of law.
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1. The Legal Standard Governing Dreamstime’s Fraud-Based UCL
Claims
Dreamstime alleged claims against Google based upon the “fraud” prong of
the UCL. Section 17200 of the UCL covers acts or practices that are “unfair,”
“fraudulent” or “unlawful.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; Lozano v. AT&T
Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Rubio v. Capital
One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010). Section 17200 is “broad,”
“sweeping” and intended “to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful business
conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180-81 (1999) (internal
quotations omitted).
Under the UCL’s “fraud” prong, “[a] fraudulent business practice is one
which is likely to deceive the public.” McKell v. Wash. Mutual 142 Cal. App. 4th
1457, 1471 (2008). Common law fraud can support a UCL-fraud claim. See
Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 A defendant
may commit fraud in at least three distinct ways. The first way is making an
affirmative misrepresentation of fact or an intentional omission of a material fact.
In re Carrier IQ, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Lovejoy v.

See also Worldwide Travel, Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc., 2015 WL 1013704 at
*11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015).

25
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AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 88 (2001), (quoting Stevens v. Super. Ct., 180 Cal.
App. 3d 605, 609 (1986)).
The second way to commit fraud is by telling half-truths. If a “defendant
does speak, he must disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading.”
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 n.3 (2016);
see also Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 121 Cal. App. 4th 292, 295 (2004).
“One who is asked for or volunteers information must be truthful, and the telling of
a half-truth calculated to deceive is fraud.” Intrieri v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th
72, 86 (2004) (quoting Cicone v. URS Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 183, 201 (1986)).
Further, “a perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to
mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable under Section 17200.” Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded by 704 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2012).
The third way a defendant can commit fraud is when it possesses (or holds
itself out as possessing) superior expertise or knowledge regarding the subject
matter and the plaintiff reasonably relies on that superior expertise or knowledge,
in which case “the defendant’s representation may be treated as one of material
fact.” Terra Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Life Inv. Mgmt. LLC., 717 F. Supp. 2d 883, 891 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (quoting Neu-Visions Sports, Inc., v. Soren/McAdam/Bartells, 86 Cal.
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App. 4th 303, 308 (2000)); see also Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Brodkin, 5 Cal. App.
3d 206, 211 (1970).
Dreamstime raised triable issues as to whether Google defrauded it with
respect to both AdWords and the reasons for Dreamstime’s organic search
demotion.
2. Dreamstime Raised Genuine Issues of Disputed Material Fact as to its
Fraud-Based UCL Claims Related to Google’s AdWords Misconduct
The district erroneously disposed of Dreamstime’s AdWords-related UCLfraud claims because of contractual disclaimers in the AdWords Agreement. It
therefore did not analyze Dreamstime’s evidence of Google’s misrepresentations
about how specific AdWords tools worked. A de novo review of the evidence
indicates several disputed issues of material fact.
i.

The “No Guarantees” Provision in the AdWords Agreement
Does Not Shield Google from Liability for Fraud Regarding
its AdWords Programs

In disposing of Dreamstime’s AdWords-related claims, the district court
erroneously relied exclusively on a “no guarantees” provision in the AdWords
Agreement. 1-ER-20-21.
Under California law, one cannot disclaim fraud through contract. Cal. Civ.
Code § 1668 (“[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud . . . are against the policy of
the law”); McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 Cal. App. 4th 784, 794 (2008)
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(lease disclaimer did not insulate defendant from liability for fraud); see also
Manderville v. PCG&S Group Inc., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1486, 1497-1500 (2007)
(clause that broker “did not guarantee” condition of property did not foreclose
fraud claims); Health Net of Cal, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 113 Cal. App. 4th
224, 232 (2003); Darnaa, LLC v. Google LLC, 756 Fed. App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir.
2018) (distinguishing a disclaimer for fraud, which violates Section 1668, from a
limitation of liability for breach of contract).
Thus, as a matter of law, the “no guarantees” provision cannot shield Google
from liability for its many specific lies about how its AdWords tools worked.
ii.

The Evidence Presented Genuine Issues of Material Fact as
to Whether Google Committed Fraud with respect to
AdWords

Though the district court did not analyze it for the reasons noted above,
Dreamstime submitted extensive evidence demonstrating that Google’s reps
misrepresented several specific facts about how certain AdWords technologies
functioned. Google reps misrepresented: (a) how Target ROAS functioned, that it
required Dreamstime to track free sign-ups as conversions, and that switching to it
could be reversed without lasting damage (7-ER-1592-95(¶¶18-26); 3-ER-356;
358-67; 8-ER-1779-81(¶¶13-14)); (b) how dynamic remarketing functioned and its
appropriateness for Dreamstime’s tens of millions of products (7-ER-135379(178:9-179:20,218:19-25); 7-ER-1605-08(¶¶47-49, 53-54); 7-ER-1642-48; 3-
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ER-444,449,485-89; 9-ER-2125-27; 9-ER-2133-35; 8-ER-1783-84(¶20)); (c) that
Google supported functional HTML5 banner ads (8-ER-1689-98(¶¶27-49)); and
(d) that certain foreign localized ads were appropriate for Dreamstime (8-ER-178790). Where a defendant represents to a plaintiff that it “would do one thing, but
ended up doing another, [t]hat is a misrepresentation in the most classic sense.”
Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1082 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); see also In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953,
991 (N.D. Cal. 2016). These statements were all false and/or deceptive. The fact
that the Google reps misrepresented these facts is evident from their admissions in
deposition and contemporaneous internal communications. 7-ER-1429-67(136:24138:19) (knew counting sign-ups not required); 7-ER-1353-79(178:9-179:20)
(knew dynamic remarketing would not show exact or similar image); 7-ER-13801410(183:24-184:20) (did not know Google could include all of Dreamstime’s
items in remarketing feed).
Many of Google’s statements about its advertising tools and strategies were
also half-truths or material omissions. Internal documents and deposition
testimony revealed that Google reps were frequently made aware of risks of certain
tools or other facts indicating they were inappropriate, but they hid these facts from
Dreamstime. 7-ER-1593-1604(¶¶21-31,40-44) (Target ROAS not merely a
reversible test), 9-ER-2125-29 (remarketing feed size of less than 25%
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inappropriate); 8-ER-1692(¶¶35-37); 8-ER-1716 (functional HTML5 banners
unsupported by Google).
Finally, many of the reps’ statements qualify as actionable “expert opinions”
of one holding itself out as having superior knowledge, expertise and information.
The reps made various recommendations about the appropriateness of various ad
tools and continued to argue their appropriateness even in the face of contrary
Google tech support advice, and even when they secretly admitted they caused
“chaos.” 3-ER-428 (the status of sign-ups is very chaotic and there is no clear
trend); 7-ER-1637-41 (did not understand Target ROAS), 7-ER-1429-67(186:17187:6); 2-ER-121-26; 2-ER-133-42.
Dreamstime relied on these misrepresentations by overspending on
AdWords. Accordingly, every element of Dreamstime’s UCL-fraud claim related
to AdWords presented genuine issues of material fact.
3. Dreamstime Raised Genuine Issues of Disputed Material Fact as to its
Fraud-Based UCL Claims Related to Google’s Search-Related
Misconduct
The district court summarily disposed of Dreamstime’s fraud-based UCL
claims related to Google’s misrepresentations about Dreamstime’s organic search
demotion by misapplying the law and engaging in improper fact-finding.
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i.

Dreamstime’s Evidence of Google’s Search-Related Fraud
Presented Genuine Issues of Material Fact

A de novo review of the evidence establishes that Google made several
misrepresentations, omitted facts, told half-truths and gave actionably false “expert
opinions” to Dreamstime regarding the reasons for its organic search demotion.
The 2015 algorithmic change for which Google rated Dreamstime’s product
page a “

■ loss” went into effect right when Dreamstime’s loss of search traffic

began to occur.26 When answering Dreamstime’s questions about its search

demotion, Google undisputedly omitted the 2015 algorithmic change, as well as
other material facts it could easily have learned from internal tools at its disposal.
7-ER-1628-29(¶94), 2-ER-151-166; 9-ER-1920-21(¶¶98-100). Further, several
affirmative statements made in the Fischer analysis to appease Dreamstime have
now been debunked by Google. 9-ER-1920-21(¶¶95-100); 9-ER-1927(¶121); 2ER-1565-76(174:2-178:7).
Dreamstime’s expert assessed Google’s data, internal reports and deposition
testimony, and then applied that information to a review of Dreamstime’s website.
This fact alone is enough to create a material dispute of fact. The district court
seemed to infer that, because only one of the millions of Dreamstime product
pages was identified in the Google test, this page was the only one affected. 1-ER18(“indicated a possible negative effect on one of Dreamstime’s product pages (of
which, Dreamstime has millions) . . .”). But all of the product pages are
structurally the same, likely meaning that all of them were similarly affected. 9ER-1915-16(¶¶81-83). This improper inference is itself a form of impermissible
fact-finding.
26
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She concluded that the algorithm change (or a similar update) was the most likely
cause for Dreamstime’s search demotion. 9-ER-1928. Thus, there were triable
issues as to whether Google made false statements or omitted materials facts.
Google also told half-truths. Dreamstime repeatedly asked Google whether
an algorithmic change was the cause of its search demotion and Google time and
again responded by pointing to various purported problems with Dreamstime’s
website. The Fischer analysis also stated that Dreamstime’s search issues were due
to its own content, omitting any reference to the 2015 algorithmic change. In all of
these responses, no one at Google told Dreamstime that Google had not even
looked into its testing reports or run other available Google tools. Google told
Dreamstime half the truth at best. 27
Google’s statements were also actionable opinions of one possessing
superior knowledge or expertise. Google’s search algorithms are a “black box”
and Google goes to great lengths to keep many of their inner workings secret.
Thus, when Google stated that something on Dreamstime’s end (not an algorithm)
caused its organic traffic loss, Dreamstime reasonably relied on these statements.

Should any one individual plead ignorance, these statements were still actionably
reckless. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal.4th 951, 974 (1997); see
also Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 216 Cal. App. 3d 388, 428
(1989).

27
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Dreamstime relied upon these misrepresentations by going on a multimillion-dollar wild goose chase to fix itself while it poured more money into
AdWords. 7-ER-1629-31(¶¶96-97). At the very least, Dreamstime raised triable
issues as to whether Google deceived it about the reasons for its search demotion.
See e.g. Garter-Bare Co. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 650 F.2d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 1980);
Gutierrez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
ii.

The District Court Ignored Dreamstime’s Evidence and
Accepted Google’s Self-Serving Testimony About the
Materiality of Its Omissions

The district court rejected Dreamstime’s search-related fraud claims for “one
simple reason”: “Nobody at Google . . . ever believed that Dreamstime’s ranking
dropped as a result of the update to Google’s salient terms algorithm.” 1-ER-18.28
But as the court’s order recognized, “[a] defendant has a duty to disclose
information. . .when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff” (i.e., material omissions) or “when
the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because some other

This conclusion is a far cry from the district court’s statements at oral argument.
After pondering, “but why isn’t that enough to go to trial?” the court continued
(directing his comments at Google’s counsel): “And one other thing. I know that
you say there was a big wall built between the organic people and the AdWords
people, but that’s your problem. Google knew the information and if you wanted
to keep it secret, in fact it sounds like they breached the wall anyway, but that’s
your problem. It’s not – you can’t be making representations to customers with the
left hand when the right hand know[s] it’s not true.” 2-ER-60.
28
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material fact has not been disclosed” (i.e., half-truths). 1-ER-18 (citing Hodsdon v.
Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2018) (relying on Collins v. eMachines, Inc.,
202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 255, (2011)).
The question in both instances is materiality. In the cases the court relied
upon, an omitted fact’s materiality was assessed by asking whether a “reasonable
consumer” “would deem it important in determining how to act in the transaction
at issue.” Hodson, 891 F.3d at 862; Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal.
App. 4th 824, 838 (2006). Dreamstime declared it would have drastically reduced
its AdWords spending had it been apprised of the omitted facts, and this would be
true of any reasonable consumer. 7-ER-1632(¶99).
The district court ignored Dreamstime’s evidence related to materiality in
favor of Google’s testimony of what it “believed.” But even Google’s “belief”
here was a question of fact. Again: (a) Google knew but hid that Dreamstime’s
product page was a “

■

loss” because of the algorithmic update; (b) the update

occurred right when Dreamstime’s demotion began; and (c) Google could have
diagnosed Dreamstime’s demotion with its tools but chose not to use them.
Moreover, Dreamstime and its expert detailed countless instances in which
Google’s deposition testimony and verified discovery responses contradicted
Google’s self-serving testimony about its beliefs. 9-ER-1921-27. This evidence
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raised triable issues as to whether Google not only believed but knew that an
algorithm update was the cause of Dreamstime’s demotion.
C.

Dreamstime Also Raised Genuine Material Facts under the
“Unfair” Prong of its UCL Claim

Dreamstime also established a triable claim under the “unfair” prong of the
UCL. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 180. When a UCL claim is brought by a
“consumer,” courts deem conduct “unfair” where “the practice is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”
Hodson, 891 F.3d at 866; see also McKell, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 1473. The record
of Google’s various misrepresentations and related conduct noted above, if not
outright fraud, certainly satisfied one or more of these “unfair” criteria. See In re
Google AdWords Litig., 2011 WL 7109217 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (plaintiffs
stated an actionable UCL claim against Google). Notably, whether a challenged
practice is “unfair” is a question of fact. Cmty. Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis
Sec. Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 886, 894-95 (2001). 29
At the summary judgment stage, in the face of an evidentiary record bristling
with disputed fact issues concerning Google’s unscrupulous behavior, the district

Dreamstime had also alleged that the Google “anticompetitive” acts supporting
its monopolization claim where predicate acts for its UCL-unfair claim. However,
the district court’s dismissal ruling erroneously gutted those allegations from the
case, and if the case is remanded, Dreamstime requests that those allegations be
restored as part of its “unfair” UCL claim.

29
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court summarily dismissed Dreamstime’s UCL-unfair claim in one sentence. This
was reversible error.
D.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on
Dreamstime’s Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing

Implied in every contract is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing such
that neither party will compromise the rights of the other to receive the contract’s
benefits. Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544 (9th Cir. 1989);
Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 57 Cal. App. 4th 354, 363 (1997). It “finds particular
application in situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power
affecting the rights of another.” Carma Devs. (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal.,
Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342, 372 (1992); see Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal.3d 913,
923 (1985).
The covenant imposes on each party not only the duty to avoid acting in a
way that compromises the performance of the contract, but also the duty to do
everything that the contract assumes they will do to bring about its purpose,
including duties not expressed in the contract. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Access
Claims Adm'rs, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1368 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (defendant’s
failure to report its mishandling of plaintiff’s insurance claim file – though not a
duty expressly contained in the contract – increased plaintiff’s liability, thus
contravening agreement’s purpose); see also Travel Servs. Network, Inc. v.
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Presidential Fin. Corp. of Mass., 959 F. Supp. 135, 144 (D. Conn. 1997) (although
under no contractual obligation to give notice regarding further lines of credit,
when defendant chose to respond to plaintiffs’ direct inquiries on the subject, the
implied covenant obligated it to respond honestly).
1. The Implied Covenant Applies to the Discretionary Ad Support
Services in the AdWords Agreement
The district court incorrectly found the AdWords Agreement “neither
required nor conferred upon Google the discretion to provide a dedicated adsupport team to Dreamstime.” 1-ER-16-17. Based on that incorrect finding, the
district court erroneously held the misrepresentations and other misconduct by
Google’s support reps fell outside the scope of the parties’ agreement. Id.
In fact, the AdWords Agreement did confer upon Google the discretion to
provide the premium ad support services at issue. It states, “Google and its
affiliates may make available to Customer certain optional Program features to
assist Customer with the selection and generation of Targets and Creative.” 4-ER755. Google elected to offer these services in performance of the AdWords
Agreement, but then systematically used the ad-support team to misrepresent how
specific ad tools worked. This caused Dreamstime to overspend on AdWords,
frustrating its ability to realize the benefits of its contract.
Even if the AdWords Agreement had not expressly given Google discretion
to offer the ad support services, Google still breached the implied covenant. As set
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forth above, the covenant imposes on each party the duty to do everything that the
contract assumes they will do to bring about its purpose, including duties not
expressed in the contract. Lincoln Gen. Ins., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. Thus, it is
irrelevant whether (as the district court claimed) the services provided by Google
were not expressly set forth in the contract. Once Google undertook these services
to facilitate the purposes of the AdWords Agreement, it had to perform them in
good faith. To hold otherwise renders the implied covenant meaningless. A
contracting party cannot act in bad faith and thereby frustrate the purposes of the
contract just because their bad faith acts were not expressly contemplated by the
contract.
2. Dreamstime Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to Whether
Google Breached the Implied Covenant
Here, the evidentiary record demonstrates genuine issues of material fact
concerning Google’s breach when it offered premium “support” in performance of
the AdWords contract and then made systematic misrepresentations regarding how
specific ad tools worked.
Honesty is at the heart of good faith. See Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp
Real Est., Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 44, 59 (2002) (“A lack of good faith . . . suggests
a moral quality, such as dishonesty, deceit, or unfaithfulness to duty.”); R. J. Kuhl
Corp. v. Sullivan, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1589, 1602 (1993) (“Subterfuges and evasions
violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes
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his conduct to be justified.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205
(1981)). More specifically, “The covenant requires cooperation in carrying out the
contract and honesty in creating or settling disputes.” Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen,
Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1990).
Through its reps (purporting to be experts), Google misrepresented material
facts to Dreamstime to induce it to spend more on AdWords than it would have
had it known the true facts. The reps were not experts, did not understand how the
technology worked, and told many specific lies about how certain ads worked and
why Dreamstime’s organic search performance was suffering. Those lies lured
Dreamstime to overspend on AdWords.
Accordingly, a jury could reasonably find these misrepresentations, and
Google’s other bad faith conduct, breached the implied covenant.
3. The “No Guarantees” Provision in the AdWords Agreement Does Not
Foreclose Dreamstime’s Implied Covenant Claims
The district court erred when it found that Google’s “no-guarantee”
disclaimers in the AdWords Agreement eliminated any possible implied covenant
claim with respect to Dreamstime’s ads-based claims. 1-ER-20-21. Dreamstime
did not argue that Google “guaranteed” a result; it argued that Google’s reps told
specific lies about how various tools worked. Even if the alleged breaches
implicated the “no-guarantee” provision, that provision cannot shield Google from
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liability for its fraudulent conduct, which also constituted a breach of the implied
covenant. Cal. Civ. Code §1668.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Dreamstime respectfully requests that the judgment of the lower court be
reversed in all respects and that the matter be remanded for further proceedings.
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this Court hear oral argument
on the appeal in this case.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6, Plaintiff-Appellant states that it is not
aware of any other related cases pending in this Court.
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